Denying Defendants the Benefit of a Reasonable Doubt: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and Past Sex Crime Convictions by Rickert, Julia T.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 100
Issue 1 Winter Article 6
Winter 2010
Denying Defendants the Benefit of a Reasonable
Doubt: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and Past Sex
Crime Convictions
Julia T. Rickert
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Julia T. Rickert, Denying Defendants the Benefit of a Reasonable Doubt: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and Past Sex Crime
Convictions, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 213 (2010)
0091-4169/10/10001-0213 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 100, No. 1 
Copyright © 2010 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A. 
213 
DENYING DEFENDANTS THE BENEFIT OF 
A REASONABLE DOUBT: FEDERAL RULE 
OF EVIDENCE 609 AND PAST SEX CRIME 
CONVICTIONS 
Julia T. Rickert* 
 
The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States allow the 
credibility of testifying defendants to be impeached with evidence of prior 
felony convictions.  This past crime evidence is admitted solely to show that 
the defendant may lack credibility.  It is not admitted to show that the 
defendant has a tendency to commit crimes in general or that he or she is a 
bad, dangerous person.  Juries are given a limiting instruction that is 
supposed to prevent improper use of the evidence, but courts and 
legislatures acknowledge that despite limiting instructions, past crime 
evidence can illegitimately prejudice a jury against a defendant.  For this 
reason, judges are required to compare the prejudicial effect of past crimes 
evidence to its probative value before it is admitted.  If the evidence is even 
slightly more prejudicial than probative of credibility, it is to be excluded. 
Sex offense convictions are extraordinarily prejudicial—overwhelming 
evidence shows that sex offenders are the most feared and despised group 
in this country—and these convictions are not particularly probative of 
credibility.  Yet judges rarely acknowledge this when comparing the 
probative value of past sex crime convictions to their prejudicial effect on 
jurors.  This failure undermines evidentiary principles that are fundamental 
to our system of criminal justice.  A defendant who previously was 
convicted of a sex offense is left with three bad choices: he or she can 
accept a plea bargain regardless of actual guilt; go to trial but decline to 
testify; or testify, but lose the jury’s goodwill when the sex crime conviction 
is presented.  An acquittal based on valid reasonable doubt becomes much 
less likely. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., the 
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2006.  I would like to thank Albert Alschuler, Shari 
Diamond, Leigh Bienen, Kenworthy Bilz, and Steve Art for their comments and suggestions. 
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For jurors in a criminal trial to fulfill their duty of determining 
whether a person is guilty of a particular act beyond a reasonable doubt, 
they must not be diverted from that task by intense dislike for a defendant 
who has previously been convicted of a sex crime.  Legislatures and courts 
should adopt a rule that prior sex crime convictions are presumptively 
inadmissible to impeach credibility. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Late one cold night in Chicago, a homeless man came upon an 
unlocked car parked on the street.  He decided he would sleep in it.  Early 
the following morning, he awoke just as a police cruiser pulled parallel to 
the car.  He was arrested and later charged with burglary.  Because of his 
criminal history, the man faced six to thirty years if convicted.  The 
prosecutor offered him eight years in exchange for a guilty plea. 
The crime of burglary, a Class 2 felony in Illinois, is committed when 
one “knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, 
housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle as defined in The Illinois 
Vehicle Code, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit 
therein a felony or theft.”1  The requisite intent to commit a felony or theft 
can be inferred from the bare circumstance of having entered without 
authority.2  This inference can of course be rebutted. 
In this case, the defendant had not disturbed any of the valuables in the 
car.  The police had been called by the car’s owner, who reported the 
presence of someone in his vehicle, but did not specify whether the person 
was awake or asleep.  The police report did not comment on whether the 
homeless man appeared to have just awoken, but it did indicate that 
sunglasses were found in the homeless man’s pocket.  The vehicle owner 
told the police that the sunglasses looked familiar and may have been left in 
his car by a friend.  The trespasser, however, claimed the sunglasses were 
his own.  What no one disputed was that the car contained items of value 
that had not been disturbed, such as a cellular phone, a stereo, and compact 
discs. 
The known facts and the defendant’s convincing explanation of his 
motive for entering the car supported an argument that he was merely guilty 
 
1 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-1 (West 2003). 
2 See People v. Boguszewski, 580 N.E.2d 925, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (“Unlawful entry 
into a building containing personal property that could be the subject of larceny gives rise to 
an inference of intent sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction.  However, this inference is 
permissible only in the absence of circumstances that are inconsistent with an intent to 
commit a theft.”) (citations omitted). 
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of criminal trespass to a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor under Illinois law.3  
The prosecutor was devoted to the felony charge, however, and so the 
defendant would need to testify at trial to rebut the assumption that he 
intended to commit a felony or theft within the vehicle he had entered.  
Testifying would be the only way for him to introduce evidence of his state 
of mind and the only way to knock out the intent element required under the 
burglary statute.  Put simply, the whole case depended on his testimony. 
The defense attorney on the case described it as “eminently triable.”  
There was only one potential hitch: would the prosecution be allowed to 
introduce the defendant’s prior convictions to call into question his 
character for truthfulness?  The defendant had previously been convicted of 
two counts of aggravated sexual assault. 
If the jurors were to disbelieve the defendant’s testimony, they could 
convict him of the felony rather than the misdemeanor.  While no one likes 
the idea of a homeless man sleeping in his or her car, this particular 
homeless man—a convicted sex offender—was just the sort of person that a 
jury might be inclined to keep off the streets for as long as possible by 
finding him guilty of a felony rather than a misdemeanor.  A lot—maybe 
everything—was riding on whether his prior convictions would be admitted 
to impeach his credibility. 
Sexual assault is not among those crimes traditionally thought to bear 
directly on truthfulness.  Past crimes like perjury, forgery, and fraud, which 
in most jurisdictions are automatically admissible to impeach witness 
credibility, more immediately allow us to judge a person’s propensity to 
lie.4  Nonetheless, under Illinois law, any type of felony can be admitted to 
impeach witness credibility, so long as the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.5 
Common sense suggests that the probative value of admitting this 
homeless man’s conviction would be vastly outweighed by the prejudicial 
effect of allowing the jury to hear about his past sex crime, because people 
tend to despise sex offenders.  Yet judges have a significantly different 
understanding of the level of prejudice sex crime convictions inspire: they 
 
3 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-2 (West 2003) (“Whoever knowingly and without 
authority enters any part of or operates any vehicle, aircraft, watercraft or snowmobile 
commits a Class A misdemeanor.”). 
4 Part II, infra, discusses the particulars of Federal Rule of Evidence 609.  The rule is 
supposed to allow counsel to impeach a witness’s “character for truthfulness” with evidence 
of prior convictions—but not if this will lead to conviction “on an improper basis.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 609. 
5 See People v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695, 698-99 (Ill. 1971). 
216 JULIA T. RICKERT [Vol. 100 
will admit these convictions as evidence in non-sex crime trials to impeach 
the defendant’s credibility as a witness.6 
Understanding this dynamic, the prosecutor in the homeless man’s 
case offered him seven years instead of eight and made clear that this offer 
would expire quickly.  His attorney explained to him that his past 
convictions would likely be admitted if he chose to go to trial and testify.  
Upon learning this, the risk-averse client decided to take the plea bargain: 
seven years in state prison for sleeping in someone 
else’s car.7 
This result reveals significant system distortion.  The prosecutor was 
given inordinate leverage in the plea negotiation, and the defendant was 
unduly discouraged from explaining his actions to a jury.  He received a 
lengthy sentence for a minor offense.  Taxpayers will foot the bill for his 
incarceration.  This distortion is caused by the ability of prosecutors to 
present past sex crime convictions for impeachment at trial.  In this 
Comment, I argue that such evidence is almost always more prejudicial 
than probative of credibility and should be excluded for that reason.  
*  *  * 
The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States allow a trial 
witness’s credibility to be impeached with evidence of a prior felony 
conviction, even if it is a sex offense conviction.8  This past crime evidence 
is admitted only to show that the defendant, who has chosen to testify, may 
lack credibility9—not to show that the defendant has some tendency to 
commit crimes in general or that he is a bad, dangerous person.10  Juries are 
given a limiting instruction that is supposed to prevent improper use of the 
evidence, but courts and legislatures acknowledge that despite limiting 
instructions, past crime evidence can illegitimately prejudice a jury against 
 
6 For descriptions of these cases, see infra Part II. 
7 This is a real case that I observed while a summer clerk for the Cook County Public 
Defender. 
8 See Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look 
at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4-27 (1999).  
No jurisdiction that I am aware of has adopted a rule that specifically allows for the 
admission of past sex crimes for impeachment purposes.  Instead, the rule is that felonies 
generally—a category which includes sex crimes—are admissible.  In practice, sex crime 
convictions are commonly admitted to undermine credibility.  Later in this Comment, I 
discuss the relevance to my central thesis of those laws—common throughout the United 
States—that allow prior sex crime convictions evidence in to show the defendant’s proclivity 
to commit such crimes when the charge before a court is also a sex crime.  See infra Parts 
III-IV.  Sex offenses are in this treatment unique among crimes.  
9 Dodson, supra note 8. 
10 Id. 
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a defendant.11  For this reason, judges are required to consider the 
prejudicial effect of past crimes evidence before admitting it. 
Judges regularly fail to recognize the exceptionally prejudicial effect 
of defendants’ prior sex crime convictions.12  This means that when an 
individual charged with a non-sexual offense wants to testify at trial but 
knows that he may have his credibility impeached by evidence of a prior 
sex crime conviction, he has one of three choices: he may accept a plea 
bargain regardless of actual guilt; he may go to trial but decline to testify, 
potentially undermining his defense; or he can testify and take his chances 
with the jury.  A man on trial for tax evasion could find himself explaining 
his remorse for a rape that he was convicted of eight years before, rather 
than simply explaining to the jury that he had followed his accountant’s 
instructions when he filed his tax return and was unaware of the error on 
that form.  This is a problem because the prejudicial effect of a sex crime 
conviction will nearly always outweigh the probative value of that evidence 
as to credibility, making an acquittal based on valid reasonable doubt much 
less likely.  The fact is, known or alleged sex offenders13 are the most 
despised group of criminals in this country.14  Citizens are terrified of them 
and our legal system sets them apart from other criminals, subjecting them 
to special restrictions and punishments.15 
Support for my claim that past sex crime convictions are always or 
nearly always more prejudicial than probative of witness credibility comes 
from diverse sources.  But all of this support relates to our society’s 
profound aversion to sex offenders or the unique handling of these 
offenders by our legal system.16  In this Comment, rather than denouncing 
the fact that sex offenders are singled out, I propose further exceptional 
treatment of them: they should be given special protection when on trial for 
 
11 The ineffectiveness of limiting instructions in the context of past sex crimes admitted 
to show lack of credibility is discussed later in this Comment.  See infra Part IV. 
12 See infra Part II.  The full scale of this problem remains unknown, and a 
comprehensive examination of trial court evidentiary rulings would only begin to answer the 
question; it may not be possible to determine how frequently defendants with past sex crime 
convictions accept plea deals to avoid hostile juries. 
13 Not all sex offenses are created equal.  For example, child rape is much more 
despicable than “flashing.”  But Part III.B.1 will explain why merely labeling an act a “sex 
offense” makes people react to it with strong emotions. 
14 It is true that alleged terrorists have recently gained ground and are also exceptionally 
hated and feared.  If a time comes when convicted terrorists are regularly being tried for 
subsequent offenses, a rule barring the use of those convictions to impeach credibility may 
become necessary. 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part II. 
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subsequent non-sexual offenses so that jurors do not convict them for the 
wrong reasons. 
This Comment proceeds in four Parts.  Part II provides background 
information on the use of prior convictions to impeach credibility and on 
the current practice with respect to prior sex crime convictions.  Part III 
discusses why sex crimes are unique, their slight-at-best probative value, 
and the overwhelming evidence that they incite great prejudice.  The 
important question is whether these social views of sex offenders are 
imported into the jury box.  Part IV suggests that they are, and that juries 
are helpless to make decisions without being influenced by these biases.  
This creates the need for special treatment of past sex crimes evidence.  
Part V offers potential legislative and judicial solutions to the problem 
identified. 
II.  BACKGROUND: ADMITTING PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURT 
At common law, defendants were barred from testifying at their own 
trials, because it was thought that the intensity of a defendant’s interest in 
the outcome of the trial rendered his or her testimony unreliable.17  In many 
cases, this prohibition served to cripple a defendant’s ability to rebut the 
prosecution’s allegations.18  Fortunately, a realization that the common law 
was unjust on this point took hold after the Civil War, and every state but 
Georgia passed a statute allowing defendants to take the stand.19  Congress 
also passed such a statute in 1878 providing that “[i]n trial of all persons 
charged with the commission of offenses against the United States . . . the 
person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness.”20  
Finally, in 1987, the Supreme Court found that it was not only unfair to bar 
defendants from testifying, but that it also violated the Constitution.21 
Another group barred at common law from taking the stand was made 
up of those who had committed “infamous crimes,” which included treason, 
any felony, and crimen falsi.22  That last category is slippery.  The Illinois 
Supreme Court explained in 1901: 
 
17 Alexander G.P. Goldenberg, Interested, but Presumed Innocent: Rethinking 




20 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006). 
21 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (“The right to testify on one’s own behalf at 
a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the Constitution.”). 
22 THOMAS WELBURN HUGHES, AN ILLUSTRATED TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 276 
(1905). 
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Crimen falsi, according to the better opinion, does not include all offenses which 
involve a charge of untruthfulness, but only such as injuriously affect the 
administration of public justice, such as perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression 
of testimony by bribery or conspiracy, to procure the absence of a witness, or to 
accuse one wrongfully of a crime, or barratry, or the like.23 
The concern behind this long-defunct rule—and others, such as the rule that 
barred the testimony of “those who lack religious belief”24—was the same 
as that behind the rule excluding defendant testimony: the integrity of the 
trial must be protected. 
Modern supporters of these old common law rules, if they exist, are 
not very vocal, but much attention understandably is still given to the fact 
that witnesses—be they defendants or otherwise—do sometimes lie on the 
stand.  How are jurors to spot the perjurers?  Demeanor evidence and plain-
old attentiveness to the coherence of witness testimony are rarely thought to 
be sufficient by U.S. legislatures and courts, and so most jurisdictions allow 
evidence of prior convictions to be admitted for the purpose of undermining 
witness credibility.25 
Levels of permissiveness vary among jurisdictions, but most states, 
including Illinois, have adopted some version of Rule 609 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.26  The Rule reads in relevant part: 
Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime 
(a) General rule—For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a 
witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be 
admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted 
regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the 
elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false 
statement by the witness.27 
 
23 Matzenbaugh v. People ex rel. Galloway, 62 N.E. 546, 548 (Ill. 1901). 
24 HUGHES, supra note 22, at 276. 
25 See Dodson, supra note 8. 
26 Illinois does not have a code of evidence.  In People v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695 
(Ill. 1971), the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the provisions of the 1971 draft of Rule 
609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would be adopted. 
27 FED. R. EVID. 609.  The rest of Rule 609 provides: 
(b) Time limit.—Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more 
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The congressional debate over Rule 609 was quite contentious,28 and 
the Rule has continued to be controversial ever since it was promulgated29 
as a result of tension between fears that the guilty will go free and concerns 
that the innocent will be punished.30  The Rule has been amended 
repeatedly, vacillating between being more and less permissive.31 
The compromise reached by those who support easy admission of past 
crimes evidence and those who do not is embodied in the Rule’s most 
notorious subsections.  Under Rule 609(a)(2), crimes of “dishonesty or false 
statement”—something akin to crimen falsi—are automatically admissible, 
regardless of whether they are felonies or misdemeanors; other felonies are 
subjected to the test mandated by Rule 609(a)(1), which balances probative 
value against prejudicial effect. 
 
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from 
the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence 
of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such 
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation.—Evidence of a conviction is not 
admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, 
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation 
of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime that was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications.—Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under 
this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of 
a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the 
credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair 
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal.—The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a 
conviction inadmissible.  Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
Id. 
28 Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the 
Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2295-96 (1994); see also id. at 2303 (“The 
extent of the floor debate in the House over Rule 609(a) far exceeded that relating to any 
other provision in all the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
29 See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the 
Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions,  42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
289, 289 (2008) (describing the admission of prior convictions to impeach defendant 
testimony as “one of the most controversial trial practices in American criminal 
jurisprudence”). 
30 See Gold, supra note 28, at 2310 (“[J]ust below the surface, the fight over Rule 609(a) 
became more ideological, implicating the interests of society in convicting the guilty, and the 
interests of the accused in receiving a fair trial and in being acquitted when innocent of the 
crimes currently charged.”). 
31 See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s notes.  
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The crimes automatically admissible for witness impeachment 
purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) are understood to be “perjury or subornation 
of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, 
or any other offense, in the nature of crimen falsi the commission of which 
involves some element of untruthfulness, deceit or falsification bearing on 
the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.”32  There has been 
disagreement over exactly which crimes fit into this category,33 but sex 
offenses clearly do not. 
Felonies of any type are deemed admissible for impeachment purposes 
on the theory that those who commit felonious acts are simply less credible 
than are law-abiding citizens.34  Felony sex offenses, like any other felony, 
are subject to the balancing test mandated by 609(a).  The rule is that when 
the witness in question is the defendant, a past conviction with greater 
prejudicial effect than probative value must be excluded; for other 
witnesses, the prejudicial effect must “substantially outweigh” the probative 
value to be non-admissible, which is the test under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403.35  Trial court judges are given broad discretion in their 
application of this test,36 and their determinations are reviewed only for 
abuse of discretion.37  The Fifth Circuit requires that prejudice and 
probativity be weighed “on the record,”38 while other circuits merely 
encourage such an approach.39 
The application of any balancing test that asks a judge to determine 
what impression a piece of information will make on the minds of jurors is 
 
32 Id. 
33 “The Advisory Committee concluded that the Conference Report provides sufficient 
guidance to trial courts and that no amendment is necessary, notwithstanding some decisions 
that take an unduly broad view of ‘dishonesty,’ admitting convictions such as for bank 
robbery or bank larceny.”  Id. 
34 See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE 
L.J. 763, 776 (1961) (“The premise of the broad impeachment rules seems to be that a 
person’s general character can be determined by evidence of past criminal acts and that 
general character can be a meaningful index of propensity to lie.”). 
35 FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 404 (barring admission of 
character evidence to prove action in conformity therewith, except in particular 
circumstances). 
36 United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977) (explaining that the 
trial court has broad discretion in its application of the Rule 609 test). 
37 United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 385 (5th Cir. 1983). 
38 United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 (5th Cir. 1979). 
39 See United States v. De La Cruz, 902 F.2d 121, 123 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Key, 717 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 
(7th Cir. 1976). 
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inherently fraught with challenges.  Regardless of whether judges are 
uniquely or especially qualified to make such psychological findings, they 
are tasked with the job, and therefore have developed some guidelines for 
performing it.  The District of Columbia Circuit’s influential take on how a 
judge’s discretion should be exercised in this context was laid out in United 
States v. Gordon: “[W]e must look to the legitimate purpose of 
impeachment which is, of course, not to show that the accused who takes 
the stand is a ‘bad’ person but rather to show background facts which bear 
directly on whether jurors ought to believe him rather than other and 
conflicting witnesses.”40 
The Gordon court identified several factors that should be weighed 
when making a past crimes admissibility determination.41  These factors 
were later summarized in a Seventh Circuit case as follows: “(1) The 
impeachment value of the prior crime.  (2) The point in time of the 
conviction and the witness’ subsequent history.  (3) The similarity between 
the past crime and the charged crime.  (4) The importance of the 
defendant’s testimony.  (5) The centrality of the credibility issue.”42 
Gordon did not purport to furnish a comprehensive analytical tool,43 
but there is one area in which the factors fall egregiously short: they do not 
acknowledge that, regardless of the charged crime, some felony convictions 
are far more likely to inspire prejudice in jurors than are others.  Nor is this 
fact routinely acknowledged by judges presiding over trials that involve 
defendants who were previously convicted of sex crimes.  Instead, it has 
been held proper to impeach a defendant charged with bank robbery using 
evidence of his prior conviction for sexual assault.44  The credibility of a 
defendant charged with “knowingly and intentionally causing a threatening 
communication to be delivered by mail” has been impeached with evidence 
of an aggravated sexual abuse conviction.45  Even when a multitude of less-
inflammatory felonies were available to the prosecution for impeachment 
purposes, sex crime convictions have been admitted into evidence.46  In 
 
40 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
41 Id. 
42 Mahone, 537 F.2d at 929. 
43 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941 (“[T]he very nature of judicial discretion precludes rigid 
standards for its exercise; we seek to give some assistance to the trial judge to whom we 
have assigned the extremely difficult task of weighing and balancing these elusive 
concepts.”). 
44 United States v. White, 222 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000). 
45 United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1992). 
46 United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2004).  A man charged with 
being a felon in possession of a firearm had six felony convictions on his record, one of 
which was a sex crime.  Id.  All six were admitted to impeach his credibility.  Id. 
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most state courts, prior sex crime convictions are also generally admissible 
for impeachment purposes. 
No state has singled out sex crimes for special treatment in the witness 
impeachment context.47  A few, however, have eschewed adoption of Rule 
609 and have created alternative rules that either increase the chance that 
past sex crime evidence will be admitted or decrease it as compared to Rule 
609.  California and Hawaii are among these rogue states, and both avoid 
balancing prejudicial effect against probative value—but that is where the 
similarities end.  California law states, “For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness 
or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony,” 
unless the witness has been pardoned or has received an official certificate 
of rehabilitation.48  This is much more permissive than Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609.  Hawaii, conversely, will not admit prior conviction evidence 
to attack credibility unless the defense has “introduced testimony for the 
purpose of establishing the defendant’s credibility as a witness” and the 
prior conviction was for a crime of dishonesty.49  In other words, if a 
defendant testifies that he or she is impeccably honest, but actually has been 
previously convicted of fraud, then that conviction can be admitted for 
impeachment in Hawaii.   
One other state-law impeachment doctrine worth mentioning is 
impeachment by evidence of a conviction involving “moral turpitude.”50  
Sex crimes fit squarely into that category, but this approach to impeachment 
 
47 My research has not turned up any jurisdiction that does so. 
48 CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995). 
49 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1, R. 609 (LexisNexis 2007). 
50 The former Alabama “moral turpitude” impeachment statute reads: 
(a) No objection must be allowed to the competency of a witness because of his conviction for 
any crime, except perjury or subornation of perjury. 
(b) As affecting his credibility, a witness may be examined touching his conviction for a crime 
involving moral turpitude, and his answers may be contradicted by other evidence. 
ALA. CODE § 12-21-162 (LexisNexis 2005).  Walton Jackson conducted a survey of 
Alabama’s appellate courts to determine which crimes have been held to involve moral 
turpitude.  Such crimes include: 
abortion; adultery; assault in the second degree; assault with the intent to murder; assault with 
the intent to rob; altering the identification of a firearm; attempted theft in the second degree; 
attempted sexual abuse; burglary; buying, receiving, and concealing stolen goods; conspiracy 
where the object of the conspiracy is a crime involving moral turpitude; carnal knowledge; 
desertion in the time of war; forgery; fraud; gambling; grand larceny; income tax evasion; 
larceny (theft in today’s nomenclature); manslaughter in the first degree; murder; rape; robbery; 
passing a worth- less check; and the illegal sale of controlled substances. 
J. Walton Jackson, Comment, Impeachment of a Witness by Prior Convictions Under 
Alabama Rule of Evidence 609: Everything Remains the Same, or Does It?, 48 ALA. L. REV. 
253, 257-58 (1996). 
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has fallen out of favor.51  This move may reflect a growing understanding 
that impeachment with certain past crimes encourages jurors to convict on 
an improper basis.  
III.  WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT SEX CRIMES? 
Those commentators who argue that virtually no prior convictions 
should be admitted to attack credibility because they cause undue prejudice 
or have an undesirable chilling effect on defendant testimony could well be 
right.52  And admitting that sort of evidence in the case of defendant-
witnesses may not be necessary, because if the defendant is guilty, he or she 
already has a strong incentive to lie on the stand, and jurors know it.53  But 
there is something to be said on the other side of the argument: it is 
plausible that felons are more prone to dishonesty than are law-abiding 
citizens.54  And there is no doubt that career con-artists and habitual 
perjurers can make pretty slick-yet-unreliable witnesses.  Perhaps in such 
cases the jury should be warned about the witness’s tendencies.55  When it 
comes to evidence of past sex crimes, however, there are a slew of reasons 
to believe that such evidence is vastly more prejudicial than it is probative 
 
51 Alabama has adopted Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Compare FED. R. 
EVID. 609, with ALA. CODE § 12-21-162(b). 
52 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal 
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008) (describing 
the legal rule permitting impeachment with prior convictions as bringing about “the 
defendant-silencing status quo by severely penalizing defendants who exercise the right to 
testify”); Dodson, supra note 8; Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note 34, at 774-78. 
53 See Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“One need not look 
for prior convictions to find motivation to falsify, for certainly that motive inheres in any 
case, whether or not the defendant has a prior record.  What greater incentive is there than 
the avoidance of conviction?  We can expect jurors to be naturally wary of the defendant’s 
testimony, even though they may be unaware of his past conduct.”). 
54 See United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The rationale of 
the rule allowing impeachment by the use of former convictions is that unbelieveability may 
be inferred from defendant’s general readiness to do evil.  Prior convictions may indicate the 
accused has a criminal nature and thus, has a propensity to falsify his testimony.”). 
55 The case for admitting some, but not all, prior convictions for impeachment purposes 
was made well in Brown, 370 F.2d at 244-45: 
The reason for exposing the defendant’s prior record is to attack his character, to call into 
question his reliability for truth-telling by showing his prior, relevant antisocial conduct . . . . 
[T]he trial judge, in weighing the prejudice that might result from its admission against the 
interest in having the defendant testify, should focus on just how relevant to credibility a 
particular conviction may be.  While one who has recently been convicted of perjury might well 
be suspected of lying again under oath, the fact that a defendant accused of assault has already 
been convicted of assault has no such bearing on credibility. Certainly the prior assault 
establishes a history of violent behavior, but proof of prior violent behavior is inadmissible to 
prove assault. 
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of credibility.  I will explore the evidence that sex crimes are especially 
prejudicial below, but first I will discuss the other side of the balancing test: 
the probative value prior sex crime convictions have in the credibility 
context. 
A.  PROBATIVE VALUE 
How probative of witness credibility are previous sex crime 
convictions?  Though I have found no definitive answer to this question, 
such convictions are arguably less probative of credibility than are many 
other crimes.  As explained above, Rule 609 acknowledges that some 
criminal convictions are more indicative of dishonesty than others.56  
Crimes of “dishonesty or false statement,” governed by Rule 609(a)(2), are 
considered so probative of credibility that they should never be excluded, 
and so Congress has removed any judicial discretion to do so.57  Judges 
have reasoned that felonies not falling under 609(a)(2) also vary in their 
relevance to credibility.58  Bank robbery, for instance, is probably more 
indicative of dishonesty than is manslaughter. 
So where does this leave sex offenses, relatively speaking?  Such 
crimes, particularly if it is true that they are the manifestation of a 
 
56 The defendant who is most likely to lie on the stand is the guilty defendant, regardless 
of whether this is the first time or the tenth time he or she is being prosecuted.  If I had to 
make my best guess as to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, without being able to judge from 
the other evidence available, I would want to know if the defendant had committed crimes 
previously.  It would demonstrate to me a propensity to commit crimes.  But Rule 609 is not 
about propensity; it is about credibility.  Plus, it should always be remembered that many 
persons with criminal records have been pegged for very serious crimes they did not commit 
because such members of society are easy targets for law enforcement officials and career 
prosecutors. 
57 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 7103 (1974) (“The admission of prior convictions 
involving dishonesty and false statement is not within the discretion of the Court. Such 
convictions are peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule, are always to be 
admitted. Thus, judicial discretion granted with respect to the admissibility of other prior 
convictions is not applicable to those involving dishonesty or false statement.”).  The Rule 
also conserves judicial resources by relieving judges of the burden of applying a balancing 
test in those cases. 
58 Consider the following discussion from Gordon v. United States: 
In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for example, are 
universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a man’s honesty and integrity. Acts 
of violence on the other hand, which may result from a short temper, a combative nature, 
extreme provocation, or other causes, generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and 
veracity.  A “rule of thumb” thus should be that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct 
relate to credibility whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not; traffic 
violations, however serious, are in the same category. 
383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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compulsion,59 arguably fall nearer to manslaughter than to bank robbery.  
Some courts have agreed and have found that sex crime convictions have 
little probative value in the credibility context.60  Additionally, studies show 
that those who are convicted of sex offenses are significantly less likely to 
commit non-sex crimes than are other types of criminals.61  Does this mean 
that sex offenders are less likely to commit the crime of perjury than are 
defendants previously convicted of non-sex crimes?  Perhaps not, but in any 
event, I have encountered no argument that past sex crimes are especially 
probative of a witness’s propensity to lie on the stand. 
B.  PREJUDICIAL EFFECT 
The prejudicial effect of impeachment with past sex crime convictions 
is much clearer than their probative value.  Without doubt, the fact that a 
witness-defendant was previously convicted of a sex crime is exceptionally 
and inappropriately prejudicial.  While considering the evidence that 
follows to support this claim, keep in mind why Rule 609 exists: 
Since all effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party 
against whom it is offered, prejudice which calls for exclusion is given a more 
specialized meaning: an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, 
contempt, retribution or horror.62 
There are numerous reasons, all involving the special status of sex offenses 
in our laws and minds, to conclude that prior sex crime convictions are 
exactly the type of prejudicial evidence described above. 
Behind the ways sex offenders are set apart by our legal system is, 
naturally, society’s view of sex offenders.  And the public’s perception is in 
 
59 See Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 653 (2008). 
60 See Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that “the trial 
judge correctly noted that a conviction for rape was not highly probative of credibility”); 
United States v. Larsen, 596 F.2d 347, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The fact that a defendant has 
been convicted of child molesting bears only nominally on credibility . . . .”). 
61 “Sex offenders were less likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any 
offense—43 percent of sex offenders versus 68 percent of non-sex offenders.”  BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
crimoff.htm#recidivism (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).  This statistic should not be read as 
suggesting that sex offenders don’t have a tendency to commit future sex offenses: “Sex 
offenders were about four times more likely than non-sex offenders to be arrested for another 
sex crime after their discharge from prison—5.3 percent of sex offenders versus 1.3 percent 
of non-sex offenders.”  Id.  Furthermore, “Within 3 years of release, 2.5% of released rapists 
were rearrested for another rape,” while only “1.2% of those who had served time for 
homicide were arrested for a new homicide.”  Id. 
62 Woods v. Zeluff, 158 P.3d 552, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
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turn influenced by the legal regime it inspired.  An examination of both 
sides of the equation follows. 
1.  Society’s Attitude Toward Sex Offenders 
Multiple studies have shown that repugnance, anger, and fear are the 
most common reactions to sex offenders.63  Community members’ anxiety 
levels rise sharply when a sex offender moves nearby,64 while property 
values fall.65  Released sex offenders face harassment, vandalism, 
unemployment, homelessness, and, on occasion, murder.66  Remarkably, 
one study found that people object more strenuously to living near 
convicted child molesters than to living near convicted murderers.67 
Even prejudice against potential sex offenders is pervasive.  Long 
before conviction, the merest allegation that a person has committed a sex 
crime can turn communities against the accused, even if no real evidence 
has been offered.68  This was recently illustrated dramatically by the Duke 
 
63 See Robert Paul Doyle, Proposition 83, Framing and Public Attitudes Toward Sex 
Offenders: An Application of Heuristic Models of Social Judgment (Aug. 10, 2009) 
(working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1444688.  Sex crimes have been described as the “most feared” crimes.  See Catherine L. 
Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 295, 298 (2006). 
64 See Michael P. Griffin & Desiree A. West, The Lowest of the Low?  Addressing the 
Disparity Between Community View, Public Policy, and Treatment Effectiveness for Sex 
Offenders, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 143, 156-57 (2006). 
65 Id. at 157 (“[H]ouses were sold for 17.4% less money than other homes if they were 
within 0.1 miles of a registered sex offender.”). 
66 See Carpenter, supra note 63, at 360 (explaining the stigma and many difficulties 
faced by registered sex offenders); id. at 301 n.16 (citing the case of a man who murdered 
two registered child molesters after learning they had moved to his area).  Carpenter asserts 
that “the collective fear over sex offenders continues to escalate.”  Id. at 301.  Consider the 
following description from E.B. v. Verniero as well: 
[R]egistrants and their families have experienced profound humiliation and isolation as a result 
of the reaction of those notified.  Employment and employment opportunities have been 
jeopardized or lost.  Housing and housing opportunities have suffered a similar fate.  Family and 
other personal relationships have been destroyed or severely strained.  Retribution has been 
visited by private, unlawful violence and threats and, while such incidents of “vigilante justice” 
are not common, they happen with sufficient frequency and publicity that registrants justifiably 
live in fear of them.  It also must be noted that these indirect effects are not short lived. While 
there are suggestions in the record that the circumstances of a registrant may stabilize as time 
passes after notification, the statute permits repeat notification over a period of many years. 
119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997). 
67 Griffin & West, supra note 64, at 156 (citing Alica Caputo & Stanley L. Brodsky, 
Citizen Coping with Community Notification of Released Sex Offenders, 22 BEHAVIORAL 
SCI. & L. 239 (2004)). 
68 See generally Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex 
Abuse Trials, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5 (1997). 
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lacrosse team rape scandal.69  A dismayed community, a shamed university, 
and an over-eager prosecutor visited grave consequences on the young men 
charged—without first objectively assessing their guilt.70  Such 
condemnation is infinitely swifter and more enduring when the alleged 
victim is a child.  “The media and the public are ready to condemn those 
accused of child sex crimes well before they have had their chance to 
present a defense, often before the prosecution even has enough evidence 
for a formal charge.”71  The documentary film Capturing the Friedmans is a 
chilling account of what can happen when allegations of child sex abuse are 
leveled.72  The most outlandish stories will be given credence once people 
have become inflamed and frightened.73 
Do these extreme negative attitudes extend to all sex offenders, or just 
the worst ones?  There is reason to believe that simply calling an act a sex 
offense makes most people react more negatively to it.  A paper by Robert 
Doyle posits that the media’s intense focus on the most heinous sex 
offenders triggers the “availability heuristic” and the “representativeness 
heuristic,” causing the public to perceive most or all so-called sex offenders 
as extremely threatening and intractably deviant.74  All sex offenders come 
to be seen as dangerous sexual predators.75  This effect is demonstrated by a 
study showing that, on average, non-victims have a more negative 
perception of sex offenders than sex crime victims have.76 
Heuristics aside, there is a conscious attempt underway to associate 
less serious sex offenses with the most serious ones.  A recent commentary 
on CNN.com made this plea: 
 
69 See Aaron Beard, Prosecutors Drop Charges in Duke Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 
2008, at A1. 
70 Id. 
71 Anna K. LaRoy, Comment, Discovering Child Pornography: The Death of the 
Presumption of Innocence, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 559, 559-60 (2008). 
72 See CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS (Home Box Office 2003). 
73 See id. 
74 See generally Doyle, supra note 63.  The availability heuristic is employed when 
people estimate the frequency of a particular circumstance based on the ease with which it 
comes to mind.  Id. at 13.  The representativeness heuristic is the tendency of individuals to 
attribute the characteristics of the most vivid and emotion-provoking class members to the 
entire class (e.g., sex offenders).  Id. at 14. 
75 Id. at 22; Griffin & West, supra note 64, at 155 (“Inclusive labeling, in this instance, is 
the overgeneralization that all sex offenders are predators.  Politicians, media, and 
professionals in the field interchange the terms ‘sex offender’ and ‘sexual predator’ 
regardless of the fact that they are not the same construct.”). 
76 Doyle, supra note 63, at 14 (citing K. Ferguson & C.A. Ireland, Attitudes Towards Sex 
Offenders and the Influence of Offence Type: A Comparison of Staff Working in a Forensic 
Setting and Students, 8 BRIT. J. FORENSIC PRAC. 10-19 (2006)). 
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As a nation, we must realize there is no such thing as a “minor” sexual offense . . . .  
Sex offenders start off by nabbing the easy prey—committing the so-called “minor” 
sexual offenses like flashing random women . . . .  Then, after getting away with it or 
receiving a slap on the wrist, they become hungrier and develop into full-fledged 
predators.  And it’s only when they sink their teeth into their prey that the legal 
system finally brings down the hammer.  But it’s too late. . . .  To stop this 
progression, we must start treating all sexual offenses as major crimes. . . .  The 
simple answer is to take all sex offenders off the streets, from the moment they 
commit the first “minor” offense.77 
Anecdotally, those outside of the legal community with whom I have 
discussed my Comment topic have expressed a greater willingness to 
convict a defendant who has a past sex crime conviction than a defendant 
who was previously convicted of another type of offense.  Many did not 
think it was improper to be influenced by knowledge of the conviction.  
Some even expressed a lack of concern over the hypothetical defendant’s 
actual guilt in the crime charged.  After describing the problem addressed in 
this Comment to one acquaintance, he suggested, “Maybe the answer is for 
those sex offenders to just not do that stuff in the first place,” which 
perfectly illustrates my point.  The studies discussed above suggest that this 
attitude is pervasive. 
2.  Special Rules for Prosecuting Sex Offenders 
Though Federal Rule of Evidence 609 doesn’t give special status to 
sex crimes, Rules 413 and 414 do.  These rules facilitate sex crime 
prosecutions by making an exception to the general ban on character 
propensity evidence:78 a past act of sexual assault or child molestation can 
be admitted to show propensity to commit the same type of crime.79  Rule 
413(a) provides that “[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is accused 
 
77 Jane Velez-Mitchell, Commentary: Get Tougher on Sex Offenders, CNN.COM, Jan. 14, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/01/13/mitchell.sex.crime. 
78 The general rule is that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 404(b). 
Two rationales for this rule have been offered: 
[O]ne rationale for the propensity ban has been the recognition that similar acts evidence is, 
logically, so minimally relevant that its probative value is, as a matter of law, unlikely to 
outweigh its prejudicial effect if presented to jurors. 
*  *  * 
[Another rationale is] that it invites the finder of fact to punish the offender for conduct unrelated 
to the crime charged . . . . 
Rosanna Cavallaro, Criminal Law: Federal Rules of Evidence 413-15 and the Struggle for 
Rulemaking Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 61-64 (2007). 
79 FED. R. EVID. 413-414. 
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of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of 
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be 
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”80  Rule 
414(a) makes the same provision for cases in which the defendant is 
charged with child molestation.81  The defendant need not have been 
convicted of the past offense. 
A belief that sex offenses are different from other offenses is behind 
the Rules 413 and 414 exceptions.  Sex offenses, it is believed, are often 
committed by sick individuals who engage in habitual, compulsive behavior 
that causes outrageous harm to vulnerable members of society.82  Moreover, 
the nature of these crimes can make responsibility for them difficult to 
prove.83  What prosecutors need is an extra tool to ensure that these 
offenders come to justice, and that is what Rules 413 and 414 provide.84 
The relevance of Rules 413 and 414 to my argument is that they are 
one of the ways sex offenders are singled out in our legal system; they are 
prosecuted under special evidentiary rules so as to increase the chance that 
they will be convicted.85  Although the rule I propose—exclusion of past 
sex crimes to impeach credibility—would instead lead to fewer convictions, 
this result is not in tension with Rules 413 and 414.  Those rules, like mine, 
 
80 FED. R. EVID. 413. 
81 FED. R. EVID. 414. 
82 See CONG. REC. H8991-H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) 
(“The proposed reform is critical to the protection of the public from rapists and child 
molesters, and is justified by the distinctive characteristics of the cases it will affect.  In child 
molestation cases, for example, a history of similar acts tends to be exceptionally probative 
because it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant—a sexual or sadosexual interest in 
children that simply does not exist in ordinary people.”). 
83 Id. 
[C]hild victims . . . credibility can readily be attacked in the absence of substantial corroboration.  
In such cases, there is a compelling public interest in admitting all significant evidence that will 
illumine the credibility of the charge and any denial by the defense. 
 Similarly, adult-victim sexual assault cases are distinctive, and often turn on difficult 
credibility determinations.  Alleged consent by the victim is rarely an issue in prosecutions for 
other violent crimes—the accused mugger does not claim that the victim freely handed over [his] 
wallet as a gift but the defendant in a rape case often contends that the victim engaged in 
consensual sex and then falsely accused him. 
84 See FED. R. EVID. 413-14. 
85 See CONG. REC. H8991-H8992 (statement of Rep. Molinari).  Commenting on the 
prior crimes evidence rules for sexual assault and child molestation cases, Representative 
Molinari said, “The enactment of this reform is first and foremost a triumph for the public—
for the women who will not be raped and the children who will not be molested because we 
have strengthened the legal system’s tools for bringing the perpetrators of these atrocious 
crimes to justice.”  Id. at H8991. 
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are an attempt to increase accuracy at trial.86  It could be that evidence 
admitted under 413 or 414 is frequently more prejudicial than it is probative 
(of propensity to commit a crime rather than credibility)—certainly many 
argue as much87—but assessing the propriety of admitting evidence of a 
defendant’s propensity to commit a particular crime is a very different 
inquiry from the one I am undertaking. 
3.  The Prison Experience of Sex Offenders 
Even in prison, the universal prejudice against sex offenders is 
apparent.  Incarcerated sex offenders face differential official treatment and 
are subject to disproportionate levels of abuse from guards and other 
inmates.  Uniquely, sex offenders may be required to admit their guilt as 
part of a mandatory treatment program despite compelling Fifth 
Amendment concerns.88  In some prisons, they are designated by special 
jumpsuits, a sort of scarlet letter.89  Oftentimes, sex offenders are kept in 
higher-security facilities than the grade of their offenses merits, because 
“were they to escape, however unlikely, it could be a public relations 
disaster.”90 
Prison guards and even other criminals despise sex offenders, and, as a 
result, they have a harder time in prison than their peers.91  They make up “a 
distinct and disfavored category within prison populations, subject to 
 
86 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and 
Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 19 (1994) (“The proposal of these rules presupposes 
that they will be more effective than the current rules in promoting accurate fact-finding and 
achieving just results.”). 
87 See generally Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign 
His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1996). 
88 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).  See generally Merrill A. Maiano, Comment, 
Sex Offender Probationers and the Fifth Amendment: Rethinking Compulsion and Exploring 
Preventative Measures in the Face of Required Treatment Programs, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 989 (2006). 
89 Sydney Tarzwell, Comment, The Gender Lines Are Marked with Razor Wire: 
Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender 
Prisoners, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 172 (2006). 
90 Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 
CRIME & JUST. 207, 220 (2008). 
91 See Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A 
Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 442 (2006) (explaining 
that sex offenders “choose voluntary isolation to avoid harassment from other prisoners”); 
Ahmed A. White, The Concept of “Less Eligibility” and the Social Function of Prison 
Violence in Class Society, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 755 (2008) (classifying sex offenders in 
prison as “easy targets of contempt”).  See generally James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment in United States Prisons: Sexual Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
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heightened abuse from both corrections officers and fellow inmates.”92  And 
they are “disproportionately likely to be the target of sexual assault in 
prison.”93  The problem of abuse is so bad that some European prison 
systems automatically place sex offenders in protective custody.94  But 
more often in the United States, the abuse of sex offenders in prison is 
viewed as an unofficial part of their sentences.95  At least one incarcerated 
sex offender, a man named Jack MacLean, has alleged that his civil rights 
were violated by the threats and ill treatment he received from guards and 
other inmates after they discovered his sex-offender status.96  In MacLean’s 
case, a People magazine story exposing him as the so-called “gentle rapist” 
had elicited significant hostility toward him throughout the prison.97  
Predictably, his suit failed.98 
4.  Civil Commitment 
In more and more jurisdictions, judges may determine that particular 
sex offenders remain a threat to the public and should be held beyond their 
criminal sentences indefinitely.99  The psychological classification of sex 
offenders as mentally ill persons provides the justification for this 
 
92 Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments; Sexuality and the Law, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 139, 159-60 (2006). 
93 Id. at 160. 
94 See Life Behind Bars: A Cycle of Violence, Despair and Drugs, IRISH EXAMINER, May 
13, 2008. 
95 See Ristroph, supra note 92, at 144-45 (noting further that “[t]he punishment/penal 
practices dichotomy underlies Eighth Amendment doctrine and leaves prison conditions 
largely outside the reach of the constitutional prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’”). 
96 MacLean v. Secor, 876 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
97 Id.; David Grogan, Heart of Darkness, PEOPLE, May 25, 1992, available at 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20112756,00.html. 
98 MacLean, 876 F. Supp. at 697 (“I find that plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment and Eighth 
Amendment claims based on defendants’ alleged verbal threats do not raise claims of 
constitutional magnitude.”). 
99 One example is Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act.  See 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/9 (West 2008)  That provision states: 
The Illinois Department of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice, not later than 6 
months prior to the anticipated release from imprisonment or the anticipated entry into 
mandatory supervised release of a person who has been convicted or adjudicated delinquent of a 
sexually violent offense, shall send written notice to the State’s Attorney in the county in which 
the person was convicted or adjudicated delinquent of the sexually violent offense informing the 
State’s Attorney of the person’s anticipated release date and that the person will be considered 
for commitment under this Act prior to that release date. 
Id.  In 2006, Congress created a grant system to fund such programs as part of the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.  For the text of this statute, see infra note 106. 
2010] FRE 609 AND PAST SEX CRIME CONVICTIONS 233 
practice.100  The Supreme Court has decided that internment in a maximum 
security facility is not a “punishment” when it results from a finding that a 
person is “sexually dangerous” and will be given treatment while 
confined.101 
Attempting to cure mentally ill sex offenders is admirable and 
necessary, but it is easy to see how such a procedure could be abused by 
those who want to make sure that child molesters and rapists are punished 
interminably.  Such individuals are not in short supply, and civil 
commitment in many cases amounts to a life sentence.102  These programs 
are expanding rapidly in response to “public fury over grisly sex crimes,” 
leading government officials to tout the severity of their state’s civil 
commitment statutes.103  Gratuitous uses are sometimes thwarted, however, 
as happened recently in Minnesota when a federal judge denied a U.S. 
Attorney’s attempt to commit a sex offender “despite assessments by 
federal prison system authorities that he was not a candidate for civil 
commitment and would be manageable in a halfway house.”104  The judge 
had harsh words for the prosecutor, calling his actions “inexplicable” and 
“nothing short of remarkable.”105 
5.  Sex-Offender Registries and Related Measures 
In recent years, there has been an unceasing effort to track and expose 
sex offenders who have returned to society.  The number of special laws has 
exploded.106  There is a national sex offender registry 
 
 
100 Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) (explaining that civil commitment was 
justified because “[b]oth psychiatrists expressed the view that petitioner was mentally ill and 
had criminal propensities to commit sexual assaults”). 
101 See id. at 374 (“This Court has never held that the Due Process Clause of its own 
force requires application of the privilege against self-incrimination in a noncriminal 
proceeding, where the privilege claimant is protected against his compelled answers in any 
subsequent criminal case.  We decline to do so today.”). 
102 See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders 
After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1. 
103 Id. 
104 Larry Oakes & Dan Browning, Judge Smacks Prosecutors for Commitment Try, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 10, 2008, at 11A. 
105 Id. 
106 The following is a list of recent federal sex offender registration laws and their major 
provisions: 
1994—Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act.  This act requires states to track released sex offenders by confirming their place of 
residence annually for ten years or, in the case of violent sex offenders, quarterly for the rest of 
their lives. 
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and every state has one of its own.107  These databases are supposed to 
allow law enforcement to monitor offenders’ movements and also alert 
 
1996—Megan’s Law.  This act requires states to disseminate the information collected in their 
sex offender registries to the public. 
1996—The Pam Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996.  This act 
requires the Attorney General to create and maintain a national sex offender database and 
requires the FBI to periodically verify sex offenders’ addresses. 
1997—The Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act.  This act had many substantial provisions, 
among them the requirement that states participate in the national registry, the requirement that 
sex offenders register in states in which they work or attend school but do not reside, and the 
extension of registration laws to sex offenders convicted in a military tribunal. 
1998—Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act.  This act increased penalties for 
federal crimes related to the sexual exploitation of children and requires electronic 
communication service providers to alert authorities to violations of child pornography laws. 
2000—The Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act.  This act requires sex offenders who are 
employed by or enrolled at an institution of higher education to inform the institution of their 
status. 
2003—Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act.  This act, among other changes, increased penalties for some sex crimes and 
eliminated statutes of limitation for some sex crimes.  It also requires states and the Department 
of Justice to maintain websites containing the information in their sex offender registries. 
2006—Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.  This act did many things, including 
raising mandatory minimum sentences for sex offenders, creating the Office of Sex Offender 
Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office), and 
authorized a grant program to fund the creation or operation of civil commitment programs for 
sex offenders. 
Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking 
(SMART), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/legislation.htm.  For a 
critique of these laws by an online community that objects to the “draconian laws” that “[n]o 
other criminal has to live by,” see Sex Offender Issues Blog, 
http://sexoffenderissues.blogspot.com/2007/05/introduction.html (May 25, 2007).  
107 See Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website, http://www.nsopw.gov/ 
Core/Conditions.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).  Links to national and state registries are 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/cac/registry.htm. 
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community members to the presence of possible sexual predators.108  A 
global registry is now under consideration.109 
Other laws with the same goal as the registries are also in place.  
Released offenders can be required to alert their new neighbors to their 
presence.110  They may also be prohibited from living in certain areas, such 
as near schools.111  Failure to comply can lead to further criminal 
penalties.112 
All of these rules demonstrate that, from society’s perspective, sex 
offenders are different than other criminals.  They are believed to be more 
dangerous than other criminals because they are thought to act 
compulsively and target particularly vulnerable people.113  Although a few 
 
108 The national database explains:  
Using this Website, interested members of the public have access to and may search participating 
Jurisdiction Website public information regarding the presence or location of offenders who, in 
most cases, have been convicted of sexually violent offenses against adults and children and 
certain sexual contact and other crimes against victims who are minors. The public can use this 
Website to educate themselves about the possible presence of such offenders in their local 
communities. 
Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website, http://www.nsopw.gov/Core/ 
Conditions.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. 
109 Deena Guzder, A Move to Register Sex Offenders Globally, TIME.COM, Sept. 7, 2009, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1920911,00.html. 
110 See Carpenter, supra note 63, at 327 (“Community notification has been deemed a 
justifiable intrusion into the registrant’s expectation of privacy because of ‘the public’s 
interest in safety.’”). 
111 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3827 (2001 & Supp. 2009) (giving the 
registration requirements for sex offenders); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West Supp. 2010) 
(providing that high risk sex offenders “shall not be placed or reside, for the duration of 
[their] parole, within one-half mile of any public or private school including any or all of 
kindergarten and grades 1 to 12, inclusive”); see also Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 
2005) (upholding statute prohibiting sex offenders in Iowa from residing near schools). 
112 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/10 (West 2008). 
113 See generally Susan R. Schmeiser, The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy, 
Sexuality, and the Rise of Medico-Legal Reasoning, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163 (2008).  
Schmeiser explains one theory, proposed by psychologist and lawyer Bertram Pollens, 
supporting alternative ways of treating sex offenders in the legal system: 
Pollens argued that the goal of treatment for sex offenders to cure their disease required a wholly 
different legal approach from one that imposed penal sentences for specific acts according to 
their perceived severity: 
[The laws] should conform with modern, scientific knowledge, and the old traditional notions 
of sanity and insanity should be discarded.  A code should be drafted which would provide 
for the adequate study of each defendant and the sentence imposed should be for treating and 
not punishing him.  This would, of course, necessitate taking into consideration his entire 
makeup—physical, mental, emotional, as well as his social environment—and it would 
necessitate the establishment of a psychiatric and psychological clinic for each court. 
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areas have instituted murderer registries, such registries remain rare and do 
not enjoy the wide support given to sex offender registries.114 
Fear of sex offenders is so intense that legislators would rather err on 
the side of overzealousness than risk the appearance of having done too 
little.115  For this reason they periodically expand the definition of “sex 
offender” to require more people to register.116  In twenty-nine states, 
teenagers who have consensual sex with one another can be convicted of a 
crime and forced to register for many years.117  In thirteen states, urinating 
in public can get you on the list.118  Thirty-two states register flashers and 
streakers.119  It may be that juror prejudice against people with prior 
convictions for minor sex offenses would not lead them to convict on an 
improper basis;120 my point is that community fear and dislike of sex 
offenders is so intense that lawmakers feel obliged to cast a wide net. 
6.  A Unique Criminal Sentence 
Desperation to prevent sex offender recidivism has led some states to 
adopt measures that would be judged entirely too extreme in any other 
context.  The most notorious is “chemical castration.”  Some states mete out 
that sentence to sex offenders for life.121  The term sounds unpleasant, yet in 
reality it is a euphemism: “chemical castration” is actually far more harmful 
than its name would suggest.122  This is due to the daily drug regimen, 
which has horrendous side effects, including “irreversible loss of bone 
 
In Pollens’s vision of a modernized legal response to the problem of sex crimes, the mental 
health professions became not merely adjuncts to the legal one, but indeed co-partners in each 
stage of the legal process. 
Id. at 202. 
114 Editorial, Murder Registry Won’t Further Public Safety, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
Aug. 7, 2007, at 6A (explaining that a murder registry cannot be justified on the same 
grounds as a sex offender registry because recidivism rates are much lower among 
murderers). 
115 Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 21, 22. 
116 Id. (“Every lawmaker who wants to sound tough on sex offenders has to propose a 





120 Doyle, supra note 63, and Velez-Mitchell, supra note 77, suggest otherwise, but 
potentially the sex offenses that are always more prejudicial than probative do not include 
some minor offenses.  
121 See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the 
Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559 (2006). 
122 Id. at 572-74. 
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mass, diabetes mellitus, pulmonary embolism, and depression.”123  Other 
jurisdictions are considering mandating traditional castration for some 
offenders,124 and arguably that would be more humane—though it is 
reminiscent of cutting off a thief’s hand. 
*  *  * 
You never hear anyone say that a released sex offender has “paid his 
debt to society.”  Sex offenders are perceived to be especially and 
persistently dangerous, and this view is reflected in the laws that apply 
exclusively to them.125  The question whether this is justified or effective is 
irrelevant to my argument, which is concerned only with prevalent attitudes 
toward sex offenders and how they influence juror decision-making. 
IV.  CAN’T JURORS PUT THEIR NEGATIVE FEELINGS ASIDE? 
It is no secret that juror prejudice can affect the outcome of a trial even 
when limiting instructions are given.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys 
know it well and strategize appropriately, both during voir dire and during 
trial.  Perhaps some jurors are able to put aside their personal feelings, but 
as a group, all the evidence suggests that they cannot or perhaps will not 
consider past crimes evidence only in the context of credibility despite 
being instructed to do so.126 
Limiting instructions of this type have been criticized for decades as 
ineffective to prevent juror prejudice.127  The Gordon court noted that “[t]he 
impact of criminal convictions will often be damaging to an accused and it 
is admittedly difficult to restrict its impact, by cautionary instructions, to the 
issue of credibility.”128  Studies have shown that the court’s concern was 
well founded.  Most jurors use the defendant’s criminal record to infer that 
 
123 Id. at 561. 
124 “[Several states are] currently debating the imposition of surgical castration, a 
punishment practice that fell out of usage in England in the thirteenth century.”  John F. 
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1747 (2008). 
125 See Vitiello, supra note 59, at 653 (“These laws are premised on a view of the sexual 
predator as incorrigible, unable to control his conduct, and likely to repeat his predatory 
conduct if released into the public without special monitoring.”). 
126 See generally Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting 
Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985); Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note 
34, at 775-76. 
127 See Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note 34, at 775-76 (“[J]urors have an 
almost universal inability and/or unwillingness either to understand or follow the court’s 
instruction on the use of defendant’s prior criminal record for impeachment purposes.”). 
128 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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he is a “bad man” and probably guilty.129  They often disregard or do not 
understand limiting instructions.130  Dodson explains that “the conclusion 
these scientists have reached simply confirms what lawyers, judges, and 
courts have known all along.  Juries will use evidence of prior convictions 
for impermissible purposes and a judge’s limiting instruction will have little 
or no effect on jurors.”131  There is even evidence of a “backfire effect”—
instructing jurors not to consider evidence for a particular purpose can 
cause them to do just that.132 
In a trial where the jury learns that the defendant was previously 
convicted of a sex crime, the failure of limiting instructions is a more 
serious matter, because the bias against sex offenders is so strong.  Imagine 
the effect of attitudes similar to that of the CNN commentator who believes 
that all sex offenders should be taken off the streets immediately133 in a case 
like the one I described at the outset of this Comment.  A juror who feels 
that way likely would be inclined to convict the defendant of the greater 
charge, burglary, just to lock him away for as long as possible.  This is the 
sort of conviction “on an improper basis” the Federal Rules of Evidence are 
meant to avoid. 
Voir dire allows for some biased persons to be weeded out, but the 
task of assembling a jury of twelve citizens who do not have a visceral 
distaste for sex offenders may be nearly impossible; and if twelve such 
people could be assembled, I am not sure how much they could be trusted 
by anyone.  Because limiting instructions also fail to keep the intense social 
bias against sex offenders out of the jury room,134 a new legal framework 
must be substituted for the one no longer working.  For jurors in criminal 
trials to do their duty—determine whether a person is guilty of a particular 
act beyond a reasonable doubt—they must not be diverted from that task by 
 
129 See Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note 34, at 777 (“The jurors almost 
universally used defendant’s record to conclude that he was a bad man and hence was more 
likely than not guilty of the crime for which he was then standing trial.”). 
130 Dodson, supra note 8, at 31, 42-43. 
131 Id. 
132 See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting 
Instructions: Social Psychology Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard 
Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 689-90 
(2000) (noting one study in which “mock-juror judgments were significantly more punitive 
when the judge issued an admonition to disregard limited-use evidence”). 
133 See Velez-Mitchell, supra note 77. 
134 When a defendant is currently being prosecuted for a sex crime, juror prejudice is 
perhaps unavoidable.  See Vidmar, supra note 68, at 5 (“I do not care how sophisticated or 
law smart jurors are, when they hear that a child has been abused, a piece of their mind 
closes up and this goes for the judge, the juror, and all of us.”).  There is no simple solution 
to this problem—juror prejudice in sex crime cases—but there is a solution for the problem 
that I have identified.  See infra Part V. 
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intense dislike for defendants who have previously been convicted of sex 
crimes.  The next Part provides some potential solutions. 
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Prosecutors should be prohibited from impeaching defendant-witness 
credibility with evidence that the defendant was previously convicted of a 
sex crime.135  Ideally, Congress will amend Federal Rule of Evidence 609 
and state legislators will follow suit.  My proposed Rule 609 adds a third 
section: 
(a) General rule—For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a 
witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be 
admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted 
regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the 
elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false 
statement by the witness. 
(3) evidence that the accused has been convicted of rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, 
child molestation, possession of child pornography, or any other offense that requires 
sex offender registration is not admissible under this rule.  This subsection will not be 
construed to interfere with the functioning of Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15. 
The wisdom of Congress “arrogating to itself the responsibility for 
balancing concepts of probative value and prejudice that is [historically] 
assigned to the courts” has been questioned,136 but I see no reason to believe 
that this particular move by Congress would be an improper limitation on 
judicial discretion.  The new subsection would be a sort of corollary to the 
subsection governing the admission of crimes of “dishonesty or false 
statement.”  The underlying principle is that those crimes are always more 
probative than prejudicial; conversely, sex crimes are always more 
prejudicial than probative.  If Congress can conclude there is no need for a 
 
135 To be clear, I am not arguing against the use of past sex crime convictions to show the 
defendant’s propensity to commit sex crimes in a sex crime prosecution.  Whatever the 
merits of this practice, my argument is merely that it is unduly prejudicial to expose a 
defendant’s possible propensity to commit sex crimes when the current charge is retail theft. 
136 See Cavallaro, supra note 79, at 68 (censuring courts for their failure “to broach the 
question of the power or propriety of Congress’s act arrogating to itself the responsibility for 
balancing concepts of probative value and prejudice that is assigned to the courts by Rule 
403 and the long pre-Rules history of judicial control of questions of relevance and 
admissibility”). 
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balancing test in the former case, it should be able to recognize that there is 
certainly no need in the latter case, where the magnitude of prejudice is so 
clear. 
Yet there is little chance that an elected body will create a rule 
designed to afford greater protection to sex offenders who get into 
subsequent legal trouble.  Congress is rarely able to muster the political will 
to reduce criminal penalties or advance protections for any criminal 
defendants, because members fear that when election time rolls around 
there will be cries that they have been “soft on crime.”  A judicial solution 
is undoubtedly more realistic. 
Judges have already taken some action to limit the use of Rule 609, as 
the Gordon factors described in Part II, above, demonstrate.137  I propose 
that appellate judges should definitively hold that because prior sex crime 
convictions inspire such prejudice, evidence of their existence should not be 
admitted for witness impeachment.  There is no need to apply a balancing 
test on a case-by-case basis, because an honest balancing test will always 
come up with the same result. 
If a categorical exclusion is unrealistic, there are more modest changes 
that would at least partially alleviate the unfairness resulting from the 
current rules.  One would be to add a sixth factor to the Gordon test and 
direct trial court judges to lean toward exclusion of a prior conviction if it is 
sexual in nature, just as prior convictions are understood to have special 
prejudicial weight when they are very similar to the crime currently 
charged.  These five existing factors were laid out before the recent surge of 
hostility toward sex offenders and should now be revisited.  It is unlikely 
that this approach would be terribly effective, however, if the regular 
admittance into evidence of past “similar” convictions is any indication of 
the effectiveness of Gordon.138 
Another alternative—one which may be more effective—would be the 
adoption by judges or legislatures of a rebuttable presumption that sex 
crime convictions are more prejudicial than probative of witness credibility.  
The prosecution would bear the burden of establishing that the conviction’s 
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, and the court would be 
forced to consider the issue separately and on the record. 
 
137 United States v. Gordon, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
138 See United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a 
lower court decision to admit a prior armed robbery conviction to impeach the credibility of 
a defendant charged with armed robbery was proper because other factors, such as proximity 
in time, weighed in favor of admissibility); United States v. Charmley, 764 F.2d 675, 677 
(9th Cir. 1985) (finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a 
prior armed robbery conviction to impeach the credibility of a defendant in an armed robbery 
case). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The problem I have described here is not unknown to judges.  At least 
one acknowledged it when a witness who had previously been convicted of 
sexual assault was a witness for the government: 
[R]egistration as a sex offender is a “scarlet letter.”  So although the jury might have 
considered Richards more likely to be untruthful if it had known of his conviction, 
there is a significant danger that it would have instead improperly discounted his 
testimony because of personal revulsion for sex offenses.139 
Yet the strength of jurors’ “personal revulsion for sex offenses” is 
frequently ignored when the witness is the defendant.140  This inconsistent 
treatment is especially troubling considering that, under Rule 609, a non-
defendant witness’s prior felony conviction will only be excluded if the 
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value, while a 
witness-defendant’s prior conviction is to be excluded if it is slightly more 
prejudicial than probative.  It is unlikely that a sexual assault conviction in 
one case was substantially more prejudicial than probative of credibility,141 
but that an aggravated sexual abuse conviction in another case was not even 
slightly more prejudicial than probative.142  Could it be that judges are 
influenced by their own feelings toward sex offenders when they apply 
Rule 609?  Surely some are.  And jurors, I contend, generally are, leaving 
them unable to consider the current charge objectively.  Because the 
prejudicial effect of a defendant’s prior sex crime conviction decidedly 
outweighs the probative value of that information, prior sex crime 











139 United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 2008) (involving a witness who had 
been convicted of sexual assault). 
140 See United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
White, 222 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1992).  
All three cases upheld lower court decisions allowing the defendant’s prior conviction for 
aggravated sexual abuse to be admitted under Rule 609. 
141 Jackson, 549 F.3d at 979. 
142 Turner, 960 F.2d at 466. 
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